However, I have come to realize that not all notions are equally easy to generalize to a categorical setting, and one of them is the notion of subobjects. In algebra, we are used to subgroups, subrings, submodules and so on. In more topological categories like $\mathbf{Top}$ and the category of metric spaces and decreasing maps, every subset inherits a subspace topology and subspace metric, respectively. Ideally, all of these notions could be generalized to a categorical notion of subobjects.
What is common among all these concrete categories is that the inclusion of a subobject into an object is injective as a map between sets, and also a homomorphism with respect to the given structure, whether it's an algebraic operation or a topology. As morphisms in concrete categories with injective underlying functions are always monomorphisms (exercise!), one might think that the correct notion of a subobject of an object $X$ in a category $\mathcal{C}$ is an object $A$ together with a monomorpism $A \rightarrowtail X$.
The first problem one realizes with this definition is that we get too many subobjects. For instance, two monomorphisms into an abelian group could represent the same subgroup. Take for instance the abelian group $\mathbb{Z}$. Here, both the inclusion map $2 \mathbb{Z} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ and the multiplication by 2 map $\cdot 2 : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathbb{Z}$ represent the same subgroup, as the image of $\cdot 2$ is precisely $2\mathbb{Z}$. The observation here is that two subobjects $A \rightarrowtail X$ and $B \rightarrowtail X$ should be considered equivalent if there exists an isomorphism $\phi : A \to B$ such that the diagram
$$\begin{matrix} A & \overset{\phi}{\longrightarrow} & B \\ & \searrow & \downarrow \\ & & X \end{matrix}$$
commutes. It can easily be verified that this is an equivalence relation, although we have to be careful here. The class of monomorpisms into an object $X$ is in general not a set. However, in many of our usual categories, it is a set up to equivalence: That is, a class containing a representative of each monomorphism into $X$ up to equivalence will be a set. Such categories are called well-powered, and we won't deal with other categories in this post. If $\mathcal{C}$ is well-powered, we denote by $\text{Sub}_{\mathcal{C}}(X)$ the set of (equivalence classes) of subobjects of $X$.
Now, the definition above turns out to be satisfactory in many algebraic categories. I will give a proof in the case of $\mathbf{Grp}$, which also holds in many other categories.
Proposition 1. In the category of groups, actual subgroups of a given group $G$ are in one-to-one correspondence with $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{Grp}}(G)$.
Proof: We define a mapping from $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{Grp}}(G)$ to $\{ \text{subgroups of $G$} \}$ as follows: If $f : A \rightarrowtail G$ is a monomorphism into $G$, we associate to it the subgroup $\text{Im}(f)$ of $G$. This mapping is surjective, as if $G' \subseteq G$ is a subgroup, then the inclusion $G' \hookrightarrow G$ is a monomorphism. Now if two monomorphisms $f : A \rightarrowtail G$ and $g : B \rightarrowtail G$ into $G$ are equivalent, then $\text{Im}(f) = \text{Im}(g)$. Conversely, if $\text{Im}(f) = \text{Im}(g)$, then the map $A \rightarrow \text{Im}(f) = \text{Im}(g) \to B$ is an isomorphism. This proves that the mapping is a bijection. $\square$
Essential to the proof above is that if $f: G \to G'$ is a bijective homomorphism, then it is an isomorphism, i.e. its inverse is also a group homomorphism. We used this when we inverted a monic from its image. As we know, this property does not hold in $\mathbf{Top}$, for instance. That is, a continuous bijection can have a discontinuous inverse. Indeed, the following example shows that there are more monics into a topological space $X$ up to equivalence than there are subspaces of $X$.
Example 1. Let $f: [0,1) \to \mathbb{C}$ be given by $f(t) = e^{2\pi i t}$. This is an injective continuous map, hence a monomorphism in $\mathbf{Top}$. Assume that $f$ is equivalent to an actual subspace of $X$, i.e. there exists a homeomorphism $\phi : [0,1) \to A$, where $\iota : A \hookrightarrow X$, such that $f = \iota \circ \phi$. Then $A=\text{Im}(\iota) = \text{Im}(f) = S^1$, the circle viewed as a subset of the complex plane. Now pick a small connected neighbourhood $U$ of the point $(1,0)$. Then the preimage $f^{-1}(U)$ consists of two disjoint open sets in $[0,1)$. But we also have that
$$f^{-1}(U) = (\iota \circ \phi)^{-1}(U) = \phi^{-1}(U)$$
Thus the preimage of a connected set under $\phi$ is disconnected, which is a contradiction as $\phi$ is a homeomorphism. Hence, $f$ is not equivalent to any actual subspace of $\mathcal{C}$. $\triangle$
The moral here is that monomorphisms can be too general to correspond to the preferred notion of subobject. In fact, it can be showed that if we restrict to regular monomorphisms, i.e. equalizers of pairs of morphisms (which are always monic), then $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{Top}}(X)$ would be in one-to-one correspondence with the actual subspaces of $X$.
One approach is to speak of $M$-subobjects instead of just subobjects, where $M$ is some class of special monomorphisms into $X$. For instance, they could be regular monomorphisms, strong monomorphisms, split monomorphisms, and so on. In $\mathbf{Ab}$, one would want $M$ to contain all monomorphisms, while in $\mathbf{Top}$, one would only want the regular ones. Interestingly, if one only wants normal subgroups in $\mathbf{Grp}$, one would restrict to so-called normal monomorphisms.
But still, what can we conclude from these observation? If one really thinks of category theory as the correct way to look at these structures, then maybe the definitions of subobjects we have in various categories are somewhat arbitrary? Why should a subset of a topological space be equipped with the subspace topology and not some topology that merely makes the inclusion map a monomorphism and not something stronger? I find these philosophical questions interesting. Personally, I think that the category structure here is not enough, and that one should considered these categories as carrying more structure. Only then will it be possible to make sense of why we want the subspace topology instead of other topologies, in an (almost) categorical sense.
Example 1. Let $f: [0,1) \to \mathbb{C}$ be given by $f(t) = e^{2\pi i t}$. This is an injective continuous map, hence a monomorphism in $\mathbf{Top}$. Assume that $f$ is equivalent to an actual subspace of $X$, i.e. there exists a homeomorphism $\phi : [0,1) \to A$, where $\iota : A \hookrightarrow X$, such that $f = \iota \circ \phi$. Then $A=\text{Im}(\iota) = \text{Im}(f) = S^1$, the circle viewed as a subset of the complex plane. Now pick a small connected neighbourhood $U$ of the point $(1,0)$. Then the preimage $f^{-1}(U)$ consists of two disjoint open sets in $[0,1)$. But we also have that
$$f^{-1}(U) = (\iota \circ \phi)^{-1}(U) = \phi^{-1}(U)$$
Thus the preimage of a connected set under $\phi$ is disconnected, which is a contradiction as $\phi$ is a homeomorphism. Hence, $f$ is not equivalent to any actual subspace of $\mathcal{C}$. $\triangle$
The moral here is that monomorphisms can be too general to correspond to the preferred notion of subobject. In fact, it can be showed that if we restrict to regular monomorphisms, i.e. equalizers of pairs of morphisms (which are always monic), then $\text{Sub}_{\mathbf{Top}}(X)$ would be in one-to-one correspondence with the actual subspaces of $X$.
One approach is to speak of $M$-subobjects instead of just subobjects, where $M$ is some class of special monomorphisms into $X$. For instance, they could be regular monomorphisms, strong monomorphisms, split monomorphisms, and so on. In $\mathbf{Ab}$, one would want $M$ to contain all monomorphisms, while in $\mathbf{Top}$, one would only want the regular ones. Interestingly, if one only wants normal subgroups in $\mathbf{Grp}$, one would restrict to so-called normal monomorphisms.
But still, what can we conclude from these observation? If one really thinks of category theory as the correct way to look at these structures, then maybe the definitions of subobjects we have in various categories are somewhat arbitrary? Why should a subset of a topological space be equipped with the subspace topology and not some topology that merely makes the inclusion map a monomorphism and not something stronger? I find these philosophical questions interesting. Personally, I think that the category structure here is not enough, and that one should considered these categories as carrying more structure. Only then will it be possible to make sense of why we want the subspace topology instead of other topologies, in an (almost) categorical sense.